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PROBLEMS WITH THE CURRENT FPTP SYSTEM

1. Winning in a constituency is the only thing that matters in an FPTP system, even if the margin of victory is very small. Broad-based public support does not count if a party cannot win in a constituency. In fact, a party, which has concentrated presence in a few pockets may actually fare better than one with a widespread popular base, thus distorting the voters' verdict!


Example: Consider the following hypothetical scenario. Assume that a state has 4 seats, each representing a constituency of 1 lakh voters. These seats are all contested by parties W, X, Y and Z. Assume that the voting results are as follows:


  Seat 1 Seat 2 Seat 3 Seat 4 Total Votes Total Seats won
Party W
38000
8000
5000
34000
85000
2
Party X
35000
25000
27000
32000
119000
0
Party Y
25000
33000
34500
25000
117500
1
Party Z
2000
34000
33500
9000
78500
1


As the table shows, FPTP can produce highly skewed results: Party X, with the largest total votes across the state won no seats, even though the party with the lowest vote has won a seat! Party Y, with a vote share of less than the others, has won the most seats.


2. The system exacerbates communal division, because the system encourages parties to pander to localized dominant interests. To win in a given electorate, it is easier for parties to adopt myopic, short-term and populist local policies, rather than promoting a set of consensus-based policies for the good of the country as a whole. Vote-bank politics, often along the lines of caste, dominate elections. Ultimately, the system leads to great fragmentation at the national level.


3. There is an inexhaustible demand for funds, as parties spend enormously to obtain every last vote possible. While the permissible spending limit (as per the Election Commission mandate) is Rs. 15 lakhs for a Lok Sabha election, many candidates usually end up spending over Rs. 2 crores!


4. Parties resort to electoral irregularities to win by any means possible, as it's only the constituency win that matters. Apart from pandering to dominant localized interests, as we have already seen, parties also regularly resort to a host of additional illegitimate tactics. Booth capturing, poll violence, intimidation of voters, vote-buying etc. has become the norm. Parties nominate "winnable candidates", who can muster enough money and muscle power to win at any cost. Inevitably, parties consort with criminals to fund, and carry out, electoral malpractices. The cost of this criminal support is that when parties become government, they 'repay the debt' via corrupt practices.


Example:


In the current Lok Sabha, no fewer than 100 of the 542 members face criminal charges.


5. Parties do not risk losing public support elsewhere for irregularities committed in another constituency. Thus, even if a party is exposed for electoral malpractices in one constituency, the party's vote is unlikely to be affected at the State or National levels. As local malpractices by parties are not affecting their larger national images, parties continue to resort to such malpractices.


6. The system favours entrenched parties and individuals, whilst new political groups cannot make an impact. There are several reasons for this. As we have seen, the only way of getting legislative presence under FPTP is to obtain the largest number of votes in the constituencies. Thus, enormous resources and muscle power are required to win seats. Few nascent political movements can muster these resources.


Secondly, the system favours parties with concentrated presence in certain pockets. Naturally, this favours entrenched parties.While this is not uncommon in democracies, the parties in India are largely autocratic in their functioning. There is no accountability, and hence the quality of members is poor and legislators are often unrepresentative. The unfortunate consequence is that independents, reformist groups or new political formations (even those with credibility and broad support across a wide geographic area) are either marginalised or forced to join the dominant parties.


Example:


An excellent illustration of the entrenchment of dominant interests is the prevalence of local dynasties. Local dynasties exercise their family power for generations. And this cuts across political parties. In fact, 250 constituencies in the 1999 Lok Sabha elections were decided on the basis of family connections.


7. The competent choose to stay away, because of the institutionalized dominance of autocratic, entrenched parties. The finest talent is no longer attracted to public life. The flawed electoral process and the functioning of political parties ensures that public-spirited citizens find it impossible to get elected or survive politics by adhering to law and propriety. They thus choose to stay away from politics, leaving the field open to those who are already entrenched (through heredity and family connections), or have the money and muscle power, personal contacts, high visibility (film stars & sport stars) etc.


8. Scattered minorities do not find adequate representation, and FPTP often over-represents the majority community. While the vote of minorities may be important in many constituencies, they are not concentrated in large enough numbers to get parties to nominate candidates from their group.


Example:


The Muslim community represents close to 14% of the entire Indian population, yet in the 1999 Lok Sabha elections, only around 5% of the seats were won by Muslims. Similarly, although women constitute almost half of the Indian population, only 8% of the seats won in the 1999 Lok Sabha elections were won by women.

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